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REVERSING THE TIDE UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)
School's a place for learnin'
School's a place for fun
And that sure ain't gonna happen
If someone brings a gun.
I. INTRODUCTION
America's children are at war and the school yard is the battlefield.
During 1990 alone, nearly 4,200 teenagers were killed by guns.' Not
including accidental deaths and suicides, it is expected that 120 Amer-
ican children under the age of eighteen years will be slain by gunfire
this month.2 In fact, more youths will die in our nation's streets every
100 hours than were killed during 100 hours of ground war in the
Persian Gulf.3 Much of the killing occurs on the school ground. Dur-
ing the academic years of 1986-1990, sixty-five students were killed
with guns at school. 4 An additional 201 individuals were severely
wounded, and another 242 were held hostage at gunpoint.5 On an
annual basis, 39% of urban school districts report a shooting or knif-
ing, and 23% report drive-by shootings.6 Teachers are also victims of
the violence. Each day in the United States, 6,250 teachers are
threatened with violence and 260 teachers are physically assaulted. 7
To combat gun violence occurring at school, Congress enacted the
Gun Free School Zones Act of 19908 (the Act).
The Act makes it unlawful "for any individual knowingly to pos-
1 Report for the CGenterfor Health Statistics, 1990, WASH. PosT, May 9, 1994, at 1A.
2 Richard Price, riolence Spreading Like Wildfire, USA TODAY, May 9, 1994, at 1A.
3 Gordon Witkin et al., Kids Who Kil U.S. NEvs & WORLD REP., Apr. 8, 1991, at 26
(quoting Louis Sullivan, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services).
4 CENTER TO PREXENT HANDGUN VIOLENCE, CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE: A REPORT ON
GUN VIOLENCE IN OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS (1990).
5 Id.
6 Elizabeth Shogren, More Violence Seen in Schools than 5 Years Ago, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1994, at 17.
7 Charlie Weaver, When Kids Pack a Gun Instead of a Lunch, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Feb. 10,
1993, at A17.
8 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. II 1990).
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sess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone."9 Under the Act, violators are sub-
ject to penalties of up to five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. 10
The Act defines a "school zone" as the grounds of a public, private, or
parochial school, or property within 1,000 feet of such premises.'
In United States v. Lopez,12 the United States Supreme Court, in a
five to four decision, held that the Gun Free School Zones Act was an
impermissible exercise of Congress' legislative authority under the
Commerce Clause.' 3 The Supreme Court emphasized the lack of ex-
press congressional findings linking the Act to interstate commerce,
and the traditional role of local government over educational
concerns.
14
This Note first argues that the Supreme Court, by failing to apply
the well established rational basis standard of review to its constitu-
tional analysis of the Gun Free School Zones Act, wrongly decided the
fate of the Act. Under the rational basis test, the relevant judicial in-
quiry is whether Congress could have rationally concluded that gun
possession at school affects interstate commerce. Because Congress,
in related gun control legislation, specified the link between juvenile
gun possession and interstate commerce, Congress could have ration-
ally concluded that guns at school affect interstate commerce. Fur-
thermore, even if Congress was required to provide express findings
linking gun violence in the schools with interstate commerce, it did
so, albeit retroactively.
In finding constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause
for the Gun Free School Zones Act, this Note examines judicial scru-
tiny of other gun control legislation, as well as broader social policy
initiatives. In so doing, this Note reconciles Congress' ability to regu-
late through its commerce power over areas traditionally left to the
state or local government, such as crime and education, with states'
rights under the Tenth Amendment.
9 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (A) (Supp. 11 1990).
10 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(4) (Supp. 11 1990).
11 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (Supp. 11 1990). However, the statute provides exceptions
for firearms located on private property outside of the school grounds, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q) (1) (B) (i) (Supp. IV 1992), to individuals qualified and licensed under state or
local law to possess firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (B) (iii) (Supp. IV 1992), to unloaded
firearms stored in a locked container or on a locked firearms rack on a motor vehicle, 18
U.S.C. § 92 2 (q) (1) (B) (ii) (Supp. IV 1992), to individuals acting pursuant to a contractual
agreement with the school, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (B) (v) (Supp. IV 1992), and to law en-
forcement officers acting in their official capacity, 18 U.S.C. § 921(q) (1) (B) (vi) (Supp. II
1990).
12 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1632-34.
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Finally, this Note argues that the Supreme Court erred in deter-
mining that gun violence at school does not substantially affect inter-
state commerce. The existence of guns in schools creates an
intimidating learning environment which deteriorates the quality of
American education. A substandard educational process creates a
workforce which produces poorer quality goods and services. Given
that these outputs are traded in interstate commerce, guns at school
substantially affect interstate commerce. This Note thus concludes
that the Gun Free School Zones Act was a permissible exercise of Con-
gress' commerce power.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court, in determining that the Gun Free School
Zones Act was an impermissible exercise of Congress' legislative au-
thority, cited the lack of express congressional findings linking the Act
to interstate commerce,' 5 emphasized the intrastate nature of educa-
tion, 16 and expressed a desire to reserve educational issues to the do-
main of local government'17 This section first reviews relevant
constitutional jurisprudence including the evolution of Congress' ex-
panding power under the modem Commerce Clause and the interre-
lated inquiry of local government sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment. Second, this section provides a brief synopsis of the leg-
islative and judicial development of the Gun Free Schools Zone Act
and compares the Act to other related federal gun control initiatives
that have mustered judicial scrutiny.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE & THE
TENTH AMENDMENT
Under the Commerce Clause, the Constitution delegates to Con-
gress the power "[ t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States."' 8 If Congress exercises legislative power
beyond that delegated to it under the Commerce Clause, it may also
violate the Tenth Amendment,19 for both issues are interrelated.20 If
a power is delegated to Congress, through the Commerce Clause for
example, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation
15 Id. at 1632.
16 Id. at 1634.
17 Id. at 1634.
18 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
19 The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONSr. amend. X.
20 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992).
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of the power to the States.21 Conversely, if a power is reserved to the
States under the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power not con-
ferred on Congress.
22
1. Judicial Evolution of the Commerce Clause
It has been said that the modem scope of Congress' commerce
power is broad and "grants the federal government jurisdiction so
long as it can show.., that the regulated activity burdens, obstructs,
or affects interstate commerce, however indirectly."23 As discussed be-
low, such a view reflects the broad latitude given to Congress' com-
merce power when it was initially defined by Chief Justice Marshall
over 170 years ago in Gibbons v. Ogden.24 Such a view is also consistent
with Congress' recent exercise of the Commerce Clause to achieve
social objectives in the areas of Civil Rights25 and crime control.26
a. Gibbons v. Ogden: the Foundation
The Commerce Clause received its initial interpretation in Gibbons v.
Ogden.27 In Gibbons, ChiefJustice Marshall, writing for the Court, held
that a 1793 federal statute licensing ships preempted a New York navi-
gation license that would have granted a monopoly on interstate
steamboat trade between New York and New Jersey.28 The Chief Jus-
tice broadly interpreted "commerce among the several states" as "that
commerce which concerns more states than one," even where such
intercourse reaches inside the boundaries of each state it touches.29
In Chief Justice Marshall's reading, only that commerce which is ex-
clusively internal to a state and does not affect other states would be
precluded from the reach of the Commerce Clause.30 Moreover,
Chief Justice Marshall described Congress' commerce power as ple-
nary: "[t] his power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
21 Id. at 2417.
22 Id
23 Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. RaN,. 1387 (1987).
24 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
25 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) as dis-
cussed below in part IIM.l.c.
26 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
27 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
28 Id. at 13.
29 Id. at 194-95.
30 Id. The Gibbons court went on to say: "Commerce among the States cannot stop at
the external boundary line of each state, but may be introduced into the interior. It is not
intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely inter-
nal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between a different part of the
same State, and which does not extend to or between different parts of the same State, and
which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and
is certainly unnecessary." Id. at 194.
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itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no lim-
itation, other than those which are prescribed in the Constitution."
3'
According to many scholars and judges, Gibbons gave the Commerce
Clause the broad scope it enjoys today.
3 2
b. Using the Commerce Clause to Achieve Police Power
Although the Constitution did not grant Congress a national po-
lice power,3 3 Congress attempted to achieve police power objectives
though the exercise of its commerce power.3 4 The Supreme Court
initially approved a restrictive use of Congress' commerce power to
police goods moving in interstate commerce.3 5 In establishing the
boundaries of this "police power" the Court established a "direct" ver-
sus "indirect" test 3 6 The Court held that activities that affected inter-
state commerce directly were within Congress' powers, while activities
that affected interstate commerce only indirectly were beyond Con-
gress' reach.37 Accordingly, Congress could prohibit the interstate
transport of "contraband" such as lottery tickets,3 8 impure foods,3 9
and stolen vehicles.40 Congress, however, could not regulate "produc-
tion,"41 "manufacture,"42 and "mining"43 activities because these were
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) ("At the beginning ChiefJus-
tice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded.");
see al-0 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RiaHTs: BACK TO THE
CONSTITUTION (1936).
3 Classically, these police powers concerned h~alth, morals, and well-being. See, e.g.,
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
34 See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (The L.tteLo Case).
35 Id.
36 A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
37 Id. at 546. The Court struck down regulations that fixed the hours and wages of
individuals employed by an intrastate business because the regulated activity only indirectly
affected interstate commerce. Id.
38 Champion, 188 U.S. at 332.
39 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 49 (1911).
40 Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
41 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (The Child Labor Case). A federal law
restricting the interstate shipping of goods produced by child labor was held unconstitu-
tional as invasive of the reserved powers of the states. Justice Day's opinion distinguished
Hammer from other cases, such as the Lottery Case, on the determination that the evil of
child labor was confined to the original locality and ended when the goods entered inter-
state commerce. Id. at 270-72.
42 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (The Sugar Trust Case). The
Court affirmed the dismissal of a government civil action under the Sherman Act to nullify
the acquisition of competing sugar refineries, which created a monopoly. The Court dis-
tinguished between "manufacture" and "commerce." Id. at 11-18. "Commerce succeeds to
manufacture, and is not part of it." I. at 12.
43 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("Mining brings the
subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it.")
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seen as local activities which only indirectly affected interstate com-
merce. Simultaneously, however, the Court held that, where the inter-
state and intrastate aspects of commerce were so intermingled that
full regulation of commerce required incidental regulation of intra-
state commerce, the Commerce Clause authorized such regulation. 44
c. The New Deal Cases
In the 1930s, Congress extended its use of the Commerce Clause
beyond federal police power objectives when it used the Commerce
Clause to pass President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal agenda.
After initial resistance by the Court, an unsuccessful attempt by Presi-
dent Roosevelt to pack the Court, and the subsequent retirement of
seven of the nine Supreme Court justices, the President was able to
achieve judicial approval of his progressive New Deal legislation.45
Through judicial appointments, 46 President Roosevelt was able to
strengthen the power of the federal government and return the
breadth of the commerce power to that initially granted in Gibbons v.
Ogden.47 Three cases epitomize the New Deal jurisprudence: National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,48 United States v.
Darby,49 and Wickard v. Filburn.50
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,51 the Court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 against a Commerce Clause
challenge. 52 The Court abandoned the "direct' and "indirect" effects
test, and concluded that the correct inquiry was whether an intrastate
activity has "such a close and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions."5
44 See e.g., House, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1935) (Shreveport
Rate Cases).
45 For a historical discussion of the Supreme Court's initial resistance to the New Deal
legislation, President Franklin D Roosevelt's subsequent unsuccessful attempt to "pack the
court," and the subsequent death or retirement of seven of the nine justices, see DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986 at
238 (1990).
46 By 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had appointed seven Supreme Courtjus-
tices: Black (1937), replacing Van Devanter; Reed (1938), replacing Sutherland; Frank-
furter (1939), replacing Cardozo; Douglas (1939), replacing Brandeis; Murphy (1940),
replacing Butler, Byrnes (1941), replacing McReynolds; and Jackson (1941), replacing
Stone (who was appointed ChiefJustice, replacing Hughes).
47 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
48 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
49 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
50 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
51 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
52 Id. at 5.
53 Id. at 37.
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In United States v. Darby,54 the Supreme Court upheld Congress'
ability to prohibit shipment in interstate commerce of goods pro-
duced in violation of the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, stating that Congress' power over interstate
commerce was not confined solely to the regulation of commerce
among the states.55 Instead, the Court determined that Congress'
power extended to those activities intrastate which "so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make
regulation of them appropriate...
Subsequently, in Wickard v. Filburn,57 the Court held that farm
production of wheat which is intended for home consumption is sub-
ject to Congress' commerce power, because it may have a substantial
cumulative effect on interstate commerce.58 The Court indicated that
while the farmer's "contribution to the demand for wheat may be triv-
ial by itself," the effect must be considered in light of the farmer's
"contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situ-
ated .... ."59 When the cumulative effect was considered, the Wickard
Court found that "[h]ome-grown wheat ... competes with wheat in
commerce"60 because it decreases overall demand for wheat on the
market.6' In modem day cases, such as the civil rights cases discussed
below, the "affects commerce" principle of Wickard was used as a
means for permitting congressional control over intrastate activities
not directly connected to interstate commerce.
62
d. The Civil Rights Cases
In cases dealing with Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,63 the
Supreme Court further extended the scope of the Commerce Clause.
54 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
55 Id. at 112. Darby expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case).
Darby noted that Hammer's reliance on "congressional power to prohibit interstate com-
merce is limited to articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleterious prop-
erty" had "long since been abandoned." Darby, 312 U.S. at 116.
56 Id. at 118.
57 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
58 Id. At issue was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which established quotas
limiting the acreage of wheat for each farm. The appellee had exceeded the quota by
approximately 11.9 acres. Id. at 114.
59 Id at 127-28.
60 Id. at 128.
61 Id, at 129.
62 Cf. Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate C0ime,
15 ARiz. L REv. 271, 275 (1973).
63 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-2000(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The Act provides for
injunctive relief against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national
origin in places of public accommodation.
19961 1499
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Among the most significant cases interpreting the Act were Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States4 and Katzenbach v. McClung.
65
In Heart of Atlanta Motel,66 the Supreme Court determined that
Congress could regulate a single hotel located in Georgia because ra-
cial discrimination in public lodging burdens travelers, and thus has a
deleterious effect on the interstate movement of persons and goods.
67
The Court held that "the power of Congress to promote interstate
commerce also includes the power to regulate . . . local
activities .... *,68
In Katzenbach v. McClung,69 the Court found that although an ac-
tivity is local and may not be regarded as commerce, Congress may
still reach it if the activity has a substantial economic effect on inter-
state commerce. 70 The Court determined that such congressional
regulation should be judicially scrutinized under a "rational basis"
test.71 Thus, in upholding a Title II action against a local restaurant
which refused to provide dining room service to African-Americans,
the Court found that Congress had a rational basis for finding that
such discrimination had a direct and adverse effect on interstate com-
merce because the discriminatory restaurants sold less interstate food
and obstructed travel. 72
The Civil Rights Cases are important for two reasons. First, they
exemplify the Court's broad application of the "cumulative effects"
test established in Wickard73 to achieve social goals. The Court sanc-
tioned Congress' ability to legislate over a single local hotel74 or local
restaurant 75 in order to discourage discrimination. Second, they es-
tablished that substantial deference is to be granted to congressional
intent under the "rational basis" test. To the extent that Congress
could rationally believe that the regulated activity affected interstate
commerce, Congress could regulate the activity under its commerce
power. It is notable that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed the ra-
tional basis test even though, like the Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990, it carried no congressional findings. 76
64 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
65 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
66 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
67 Id. at 246.
68 Id. at 258.
69 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
70 Id. at 301.
71 1&
72 Id. at 298.
73 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119 (1942).
74 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964).
75 Kaftenbach, 379 U.S. at 298.
76 Id. at 299.
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e. Using the Commerce Power to Legislate Crime Control
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has upheld Congress' regula-
tion of purely intrastate criminal activity under its !commerce power.
The principle examples of such jurisprudence are Perez v. United
States77 and Russell v. United States.78
The realm of congressional power over intrastate activity peaked
in Perez v. United States.79 In Perez, the Supreme Court found that the
antiloan-sharking provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,80
which regulated extortionate credit transactions, was a valid exercise
of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 81 Even though the
loan-sharking was completely local, the Court held that Congress
could rationally decide that local loan-sharking activity, as a subset of a
broader class of organized crime, could substantially affect interstate
commerce.8 2 Perez established that intrastate criminal activity could be
regulated under Congress' Commerce Clause authority.8 3
More recently, in Russell v. United States,84 the Supreme Court de-
cided that setting fire to an apartment building was an activity within
the reach of the Commerce Clause because the rental of an apart-
ment building substantially affects interstate commerce.8 5 In so do-
ing, the Court upheld the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
which made it a federal crime to bum property used in or affecting
interstate commerce.86 Because Russell was renting the property
when he attempted to set fire to it, the property was being used in an
activity affecting interstate commerce.8 7 The Russell decision reflects
the continuing expansion of the boundaries within which Congress
can regulate under the Commerce Clause, despite the minimal effects
on commerce.
77 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
78 471 U.S. 858 (1985).
79 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
80 Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 159-64 (1968) (codified'as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 891-96 (1994)).
81 Perez, 402 U.S. at 146-47.
82 Id.
83 In the case's single dissent, Justice Stewart recognized that the majority intended
Perez to be applied to intrastate crime as well when he commented: "I think the Framers of
the Constitution never intended that the National Government might define as a crime
and prosecute such wholly local activity through the enactment of federal criminal laws."
Pere; 402 U.S. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
84 471 U.S. 858 (1985).
85 Id. at 862.




f. Recent Reaffirmation Of The Rational Basis Test
The Supreme Court's deference to Congress' use of the Com-
merce Clause under the rational basis test was reaffirmed in the late
1980s in Hodel v. Indiana.s8 This case challenged the Surface Mining
Act of 1977 as an unconstitutional use of Congress' commerce power.
In Hodel, Justice Marshall held that federal courts must defer to con-
gressional findings that an activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce.8 9 Justice Marshall instructed courts to apply the rational basis
standard of review to determine the constitutionality of the law. This
deferential standard of review prohibits the courts from substituting
their own analysis regarding an act's substantial effect on interstate
commerce when the legislature's purpose is legitimate and the law is
rationally related to that purpose.90
2. Tenth Amendment Precedent
The Supreme Court has held that commerce power and Tenth
Amendment inquiries are "mirror images" of each other.91 The
Tenth Amendment provides that "[t] he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. '92 Early in
our nation's development, the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Mary-
land93 attempted to secure its view of the proper allocation of power
between the states and the federal government.94 In McCulloch, the
Court rejected the claim that the importance of broad state autonomy
should motivate a narrow interpretation of the scope of federal
power.95 Instead, the Court determined the proper scope of congres-
sional power by considering what was necessary to enable the rational
accomplishment of enumerated federal objectives. 96
More recently, in 1976, the Supreme Court again addressed the
issue of federalism in National League of Cities v. Usey.97 The Court
88 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
89 Id. at 323.
90 In Hode the Court found that the activity that Congress sought to regulate impacted
only .006% of the nation's total prime farmland. While this appeared to be an insubstan-
tial amount, the Court noted that Congress had explicitly found in the Surface Mining Act
that there was a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Court believed it was im-
proper to substitute its own finding of insubstantiality for Congress' explicit finding of
substantial effect. Id. at 324.
91 New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992).
92 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
93 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
94 Id. at 321.
95 Id. at 319.
96 Id.
97 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
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held that certain federal laws which regulated the "States as States"
address matters that are attributes of state sovereignty and conse-
quently directly impair the states' ability to structure their internal op-
erating processes in areas of traditional governmental functions.98
The Court further ruled that these laws violate principles of state sov-
ereignty unless they are justified by a sufficiently important federal
interest.99 Thus, Usery protected unspecified traditional state functions
from Congress' reach.100 Usery was short-lived, however; the Court
overruled it less than a decade later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority.'01
In Garcia the Court conceded that distinctions could not be
drawn between "traditional governmental functions" and other func-
tions, and thus rejected Usery as "unsound in principle and unwork-
able in practice .... ,,102 Instead, Garcia determined that the primary
role of the courts in enforcing federalism was to safeguard against
"possible failings in the national political process. .... .,103
In 1991, the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroffl0 4 followed Garcia's focus
on the political process. To protect state functions from direct federal
regulation, the Court announced that it would interpret federal stat-
utes so as not to intrude upon fundamental state governmental func-
tions absent a clear statement of congressional intent.0 5
Although Gregory did not place an absolute constraint on Con-
gress' power, provided that Congress was specific about its intentions,
two years later in New York v. United States'06 the Supreme Court tight-
ened the rein on congressional power.10 7 In New York, the Court up-
held monetary and access incentives provided under the Radioactive
Waste Act as a means of encouraging states to implement programs
for the disposal of radioactive waste, but invalidated the Act's threat to
impose liability on the states for waste generated within their bor-
528 (1985).
98 426 U.S. at 845.
99 Id. at 845, 852-55.
100 Id.
101 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Between Usery and Garcia, the Court applied Usery's test in four
cases, each time rejecting a state sovereignty challenge to a federal statute. See EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
102 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
103 Id. at 554.
104 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that Missouri's constitutional requirement that state
judges retire at age 70 was not governed by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, which makes it unlawful for any employer to discharge an employee due to age).
105 501 U.S. at 457, 460-61.
106 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
107 Id. at 2412.
1996] 1503
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
ders. 108 The Court reasoned that when Congress requires states re-
ceiving federal funds to undertake particular legislative or regulatory
actions, state autonomy is nevertheless preserved because a state may
elect to forego the funds. By contrast, the "take title" provision
crossed the line between encouragement and coercion because it
compelled states to choose between two forms of coerced regula-
tion-accepting ownership of the waste or regulating as Congress dic-
tated. 10 9 Since the Act essentially forced states to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program, the Act subjected the States to federal
government control and consequently violated fundamental sover-
eignty principles. 110 As New York did not expressly overrule Garcia, the
continued application of Garcia is uncertain. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court's current stance on the Tenth Amendment is far from
clear.
B. GUN CONTROL & THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The constitutional right to bear arms stems from the Second
Amendment, which states that "the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed." ' Despite this constitutional lan-
guage, Congress often has imposed limitations on an individual's
rights to gun possession. 112 Early examples include: the National
Firearms Act of 1934,113 the Federal Firearms Act of 1938,114 the Om-
nibus Crime Control Safe Streets Act,115 and the Gun Control Act of
1968.116 During the 1980s, Congress enacted three major acts, in ad-
108 Id. at 2419-20.
109 Id. at 2428.
110 Id. at 2429-30.
111 U.S. CONST. amend H1.
112 Many scholars and judges have indicated that the Second Amendment was meant to
protect states ability to maintain their militia and does not grant individuals an absolute
right to bear arms. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTiUToNAL LAw § 5-2, at 299
n.6 (2d ed. 1988); 79 AM.JUR. 2d Weapons &'Firearm § 4 ("The right to bear arms does not
apply to private citizens as an individual right guaranteed by the Constitution of the U.S.")
(citing Harris v. State, 432 P. 2d 929 (Nev. 1967)).
113 National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993)); David T. Hardy &John Stompoly, OfArms
And The Law, 51 CHi-KmNT L Ray. 62, 63 (1974).
114 Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) (repealed byAct ofJune 19, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 906, 82 Stat. 234 (1968)); see Hardy & Stompoly, supra n.113 at 63-64.
115 Omnibus Crime Control Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928). This Act incorporated many of the provi-
sions that had been first enacted in the Federal Firearms Act.
116 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (1994)). This Act, which is still effective today, prohibits the selling of
firearms to convicted felons, fugitives from justice, drug users and addicts, persons adjudi-
cated mentally incompetent, illegal aliens, persons dishonorably discharged from the mili-
tary, and anyone who has renounced his or her United States citizenship. 18 U.S.C.
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dition to the Gun Free School Zones Act, to combat increasing crime
rates: The Firearm Owners' Protection Act,' 17 The Undetectable Fire-
arms Act," 8 and the Brady Act. 119
1. Early Second Amendment Constraints
In an effort to curb the extensive violence accompanying the ex-
pansion of organized crime during the Prohibition Era, Congress
placed limitations on the Second Amendment right to bear arms by
passing the National Firearms Act of 1934.120 This Act imposed a
$200 tax on transfers of certain automatic weapons, such as sawed off
shotguns, and imposed a $5 tax on transfers of other weapons. 121
Congress later created licensing requirements for all dealers of fire-
arms when it passed the Federal Firearms Act of 1938.122 In addition
to its licensing requirements, this Act prohibited the interstate ship-
ment of firearms to felons, persons under felony indictment, and per-
sons lacking required permits.
123
2. The 1968 Control Acts
After three decades of silence, Congress revived its initiatives to
strengthen gun control laws in response to the widespread civil disor-
der that culminated in the murders of Robert Kennedy and Martin
Luther King, Jr. when it passed the Omnibus Crime Control Safe
Streets Act 124 and the Gun Control Act of 1968.125 The combined
force of these two enactments imposed broad constraints on the pos-
session and use of firearms that extended well beyond their mere
transport in interstate commerce. Congress extended federal licens-
ing requirements to all firearms dealers, regardless of whether they
§ 922(d) (1994). In addition to regulating interstate gun sales, the Act mandates that a
federal license be obtained to engage in manufacturing, importing or dealing in firearms
in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (1994).
117 Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)).
118 Pub. L. No. 100-649, 102 Stat. 3816 (1988) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)).
119 Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 104(b), 107 Stat. 1543 (1993) (recodified as Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22).
120 National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993)).
121 26 U.S.C. § 5811(a) (1988).
122 See Federal Firearms Act of 1938, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250, repealed by Act ofJune 19,
1968, Pub. L No. 90-351, § 906, 82 Stat. 234 (1968); Hardy & Stompoly, supranote 113, at
63-64.
123 Act ofJune 30, 1938, ch. 850, § 2, 52 Stat. 1250 (repealed 1968).
124 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968); 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928. Title IV (§§ 901-907)
of the act repealed the Federal Firearms Act (§ 907) and enacted a new chapter 44 ("Fire-
arms") of Title 18 (18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928) which incorporated most of the provisions that
had been first enacted in the Federal Firearms Act and added further offenses.
125 See supra note 116.
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operated in interstate commerce. 126 Finally, Congress criminalized
the mere possession of firearms by certain individuals, including
felons, mental incompetents, drug addicts, and illegal aliens.' 27 Con-
gress justified these provisions by providing express findings linking
its gun control initiatives to interstate commerce. 128
Two aspects of the 1968 legislation are relevant in analyzing the
Gun Free School Zones Act. First, the 1968 Acts illegalized the mere
possession of guns, rather than the transfer of guns in interstate com-
merce. Second, among the statutory provisions contained in the 1968
legislation was 18 U.S.C. § 922, which was amended in the Gun Free
School Zones Act to include the safe school subsection at issue in
Lopez.
3. The Firearm Owners' Protection Act (§ 922(o))
In response to rising crime conducted with automatic assault
weapons, Congress passed the Firearm Owners' Protection Act of
1986.129 This Act makes it unlawful for any person to transfer or pos-
sess a machine gun.' 30 Section 922(o) denounces the mere possession
of guns without a tie-in to interstate commerce. Section 922(o), like
the Gun Free School Zones Act, did not contain any separate Congres-
sional findings, but simply relied on the findings contained in the
original 1968 enactments.' 3
1
126 The Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968 required a federal license
"for any person... to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in
firearms, or ammunition". Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 902, 82 Stat. 197, 228 (1968) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)).
127 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
128 Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901(a) contains, among others, the following express congres-
sional findings linking gun control to interstate commerce:
(1) that there is a widespread traffic in firearms moving in or otherwise affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce, and that the existing Federal controls over such traffic
do not adequately enable the States to control this traffic within their own borders
through the exercise of their police power;
(2) that the ease with which any person can acquire firearms other than a rifle or
shotgun (including criminals,juveniles without the knowledge or consent of their par-
ents or guardians, narcotics addicts, mental defectives, armed groups who would sup-
plant the functions of duly constituted public authorities, and others who possession
of such weapons is similarly contrary to the public interest) is a significant factor in the
prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States;...
129 Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o)).
130 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988); see also United States v. Rock Island Armory, Inc., 773
F.Supp. 117, 119 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (interpreting § 922(o) as a prohibition on private citizens
from possessing or transferring a machine gun that was not made and registered before
May 19, 1986, unless such transfer or possession is authorized by federal or state
governments).
131 There is no committee report and sparse legislative history concerning this provision
as it was added on the House floor. The only apparent explanation for the provision is the
statement of its sponsor, Rep. Hughes, who stated, "I do not know why anyone would ob-
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The Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have sustained the constitu-
tionality of § 922(o). In United States v. Ardoin,'3 2 the Fifth Circuit,
ignoring its earlier decision in Lopez, found § 922(o) constitutional,
based in part, upon Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause.13 3 The Ardoin court upheld the constitutionality of § 922(o),
indicating merely that "no one could seriously contend that the regu-
lation of machine guns could not also be upheld under Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce." 34 Similarly, the Eighth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Hale,'3 5 and the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Evans3 6
upheld § 922(o). The Hale Court indicated that the lack of specific
Congressional findings linking § 922(o) to interstate commerce did
not render the Act as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' com-
merce power.'3 7
The Supreme Court's decision in Lopez has cast doubt on the like-
lihood that the judiciary will continue to find § 922(o) constitutional.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling in Lopez, the Southern
District of Mississippi, in United States v. Bownds,13 8 found § 922 (o) to
be unconstitutional. Bownds was indicted under § 922(o) for the
purchase of two machine guns and their subsequent resale. 13 9 The
Bownds decision disregarded the Ardoin opinion, and instead followed
the Fifth's Circuit's reasoning in Lopez, which required Congress to
articulate an express nexus between interstate commerce and the reg-
ulated activity.140 Absent such a stated nexus, the Bownds court found
§ 922(o) to be beyond Congress' power.
141
4. The Undetectable Firearms Act (§ 922(p))
In response to technological advances in gun manufacturing and
detection avoidance, Congress passed the Undetectable Firearms
Act.142 This Act makes it unlawful for any person to "manufacture,
ject to the banning of machine guns." See Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041, 1044 (1lth
Cir. 1990).
132 19 F.3d 177, 178 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 327 (1994).
13 Id. at 180.
134 Id.
135 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993).
136 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991).
137 "When it first enacted section 922, Congress found facts indicating a nexus between
the regulation of firearms and the commerce power.... The 1986 amendments to section
922 added subsection (o) without substantially altering the findings of fact on this
point. ... [It] is within the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause" Hale,
978 F.2d at 1018.
138 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11738 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 1994).
139 Id. at *2.
140 Id at *13.
141 Id.
142 Pub. L. No. 100-649, 102 Stat. 3816 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
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import, ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or receive" any firearm unde-
tectable either by walk-through metal detectors or x-ray machines.14
3
Analogous to the Gun Free School Zones Act, § 922(p) did not by its
terms require any link with interstate commerce, but rather banned
the mere possession of undetectable guns, no matter how they were
produced and obtained. 44 Moreover, like the Gun Free School
Zones Act, § 922(p) did not rest on any new congressional findings
establishing a link to commerce regulation.
5. The Brady Act
In response to John Hinckley's attempted assassination of Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the resulting injuries sustained by
White House Press Secretary James Brady,145 Congress enacted the
Brady Act.146 The purpose of the Brady Act is to prevent convicted
felons and other legally barred persons from purchasing guns from
licensed gun dealers, manufacturers, or importers.' 47 To achieve this
objective, the Act imposes a five day waiting period on the purchase of
certain handguns. 4
Although public debate has focused on the Brady Act's waiting
period requirement and its infringement on the Second Amendment,
the background check provision and its impact on the Tenth Amend-
ment have been the focus of judicial inquiry. 49 Unlike other gun
control legislation,150 judicial inquiry regarding the Brady Act has fo-
cused on state sovereignty, specifically, whether Congress has the au-




145 See H.R RP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.CAN. 1984, 1991. See also President's Remarks on Signing the Brady Bill, 29 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 2477 (Dec. 6, 1993).
146 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, Title I, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993) (codified in various subsections of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-25).
147 H.R. REP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1984, 1984.
148 "Handgun" includes a firearm which has a short stock and is designed to be held and
fired by the use of a single hand. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(29) (Supp. V 1993). The waiting
period allows local law enforcement officers to determine the legality of the attempted gun
purchase. Id. In 1998, the waiting period provisions are scheduled to be superseded by a
national instant background check computer system established by the Attorney General.
When operational, this system will allow dealers to contact a federal computer system and
make an instant on-line background check. Id.
149 See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Mack v.
United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1381-82 (D. Ariz. 1994).
150 For example, as discussed supra in part II.B.3, the courts have emphasized the exist-
ence of congressional findings linking gun control to interstate commerce in decisions
concerning the Firearm Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o).
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background checks.' 5 '
An illustration of judicial scrutiny of the Brady Act is Printz v.
United States.152 In Printz, a local sheriff brought an action to seek in-
junctive relief against enforcement of the Brady Act's provision requir-
ing him to perform a background check on individuals seeking to
purchase a firearm.155 The sheriff argued that he did not have suffi-
cient resources to perform the background checks.' 54 The District
Court of Montana found that the Brady Act transgressed the "division
of authority between the federal and state governments.' u5 5 The
Printz court stated that although Congress could enlist the judicial
branch to enforce its policies, it could not directly compel states to
legislate to "enforce a federal regulatory program."156 Federal district
courts in Arizona,' 57 Mississippi,' 58 and Vermont' 59 have also ruled
that the Brady Act exceeds Congressional authority.
6. The Gun Free School Zones Act
a. The History of The Gun Free School Zones Act
Congress enacted the Gun Free School Zones Act in response to
the growing crisis of guns in schools and the related problems of
drugs and gang activity.160 The Act's specific purpose was to "address
the devastating tide of firearm violence in our Nation's schools"'
6 '
and to provide "an important step toward fighting gun violence and
keeping our teachers and children safe.'
62
The Gun Free School Zones Act was passed by the Senate as part
of the Crime Control Act of 1990.163 Although the Gun Free School
Zones Act was not initially included in the House version of the Crime
151 See McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 324.
152 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
153 Id. at 1513.
154 Id. at 1507.
155 Id. at 1513.
156 Id. at 1513 (citing New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992)).
157 See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1379-81 (D. Ariz. 1994).
158 See McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 326-27 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
159 See Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1042-43 n.13 (D. Vt. 1994).
160 The Gun Free School Zones Act was introduced in the House by Representative
Edward Feighan of Ohio as H.R. 3757, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991), and in the Senate by
Senator Herbert Kohl of Wisconsin as S. 2070, 101st Cong., 2d Sess (1991).
161 135 CONG. REc. 3988 (1989) (Representative Feighan).
162 136 CONG. Rc. 1165 (1990) (Senator Kohl). Senator Kohl noted that "the National
School Safety Center estimated that more than 100,000 students carry guns to school every
day, and more than a quarter of a million students brought handguns to school in 1987."
Id. The Act, he said, "would ensure that our school grounds do not become battlefields."
I&.
163 See 136 CONG. REc. 9477, 9519 (1990) (passage of the Act by the Senate); 136 CONG.
REc. 10,184, 10,240 (1990) (text of the Act).
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Control Act of 1990, the Act's provisions were subsequently adopted
by the conference committee'64 and enacted into law as § 1702 of the
Crime Control Act of 1990.165
The source of constitutional authority was not manifest on the
face of the Act. At the time of the statute's enactment, neither the Act
nor its corresponding legislative history contained express congres-
sional findings regarding the effects of gun possession in a school
zone upon interstate commerce. 166 In fact, when President George
Bush signed the Crime Control Act of 1990 into law, he noted that
particular provisions of the legislation constrained the discretion of
state and local governments. 167 The President found that the Gun
Free Zones Act "inappropriately over r[o]de legitimate State firearms
laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law."166 The President ar-
gued that the policies reflected in the Gun Free Zones Act could be
adopted by the states, but that they should not be imposed on the
states by Congress.
169
After the Fifth Circuit held that the Gun Free School Zones Act
was unconstitutional in 1993 in United States v. Lopez, 170 Congress
passed a law which included specific findings as to the nexus between
guns at school and interstate commerce. 171
b. The Gun Free School Zones Act Precedent
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez,172
the circuits were split regarding the constitutionality of the Gun Free
School Zones Act. In Lopez, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Gun Free
164 See 136 CONG. REG. 17,595 (1990).
165 See Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (1990).
166 See Pub. L. No. 101-647. Although the congressional hearings extensively addressed
the impact of firearms violence on education, witnesses did not specifically discuss the
effects of school firearm possession on interstate commerce. See Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Gun Free School Zones Act Hearings].
167 Statement by President George Bush upon signing S. 3266, 26 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 1944, 1945 (Nov. 29, 1990).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir 1993).
171 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322
§ 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125-26. Congress found that "firearms and ammunition move
easily in interstate commerce and have been found in increasing numbers in and around
schools" and that the resulting "occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in
a decline in the quality of education in our country" which has had an "adverse impact on
interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States." Id Furthermore,
the Senate stated that "Congress has power under the Commerce Clause and other provi-
sions of the Constitution to enact measures to ensure the integrity and safety of the Na-
tion's Schools." 139 CONG. REc. S16,302 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993).
172 2 F.3d 1342 (1993).
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School Zones Act was unconstitutional.17 3 The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, upheld the Act in United States v. Edwards,'74 and was subse-
quently followed in its holding by several district court cases,
including United States v. Glover'75 and United States v. Ornelas.1
76
Fundamental to the Ninth Circuit's decision was a narrow inter-
pretation of two earlier decisions: Perez v. United States,17 7 which up-
held a federal antiloan-sharking statute, and United States v. Evans,'78 a
Ninth Circuit case which upheld the prohibition of machine gun pos-
session under the Firearms Owners Protection Act.' 79 Relying on Pe-
rez, the Edwards court cited the Supreme Court's determination that
Congress has the power to regulate "those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce... as to make regulation of them appro-
priate means to the attainment of a legitimate end ... [that is, the
ability to exercise Congress' commerce power]." 80 Based on Perez,
the Edwards court found that Congress' failure to provide specific
findings of the nexus between a regulated activity and interstate com-
merce should not preclude the court from finding that such a nexus
existed.' 8 ' Thus, the Edwards court determined that the absence of
express Congressional findings linking gun possession in a school
zone to interstate commerce did not make the Gun Free School
Zones Act an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power.
The Edwards court bolstered its conclusion with the Evans deci-
sion. Evans upheld Congress' power to enact the Firearms Owners
Protection Act under the Commerce Clause because Congress found
a connection between gun regulation and the effect of violence on
the national economy.' 82 Relying on the stare decisis effect of Evans,
the Edwards court stated that it was compelled to uphold the Gun Free
School Zones Act absent an intervening Supreme Court decision
preventing Congress from so expanding federal powers under the
Commerce Clause.'
83
173 Id. at 1357.
174 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993).
175 842 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1994).
176 841 F. Supp. 1087(D. Colo. 1994).
177 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
178 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991).
179 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988).
180 United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971).
181 United States v. Edwards, 13 F.d 291, 295 (1994).
182 See Evans, 928 F.2d at 862 (noting congressional finding that 750,000 people had
been killed in the United States by firearms since the turn of the century), "[i]t was thus
reasonable for Congress to conclude that the possession of firearms affects the national
economy....").
183 Id. at 294 (citing United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 10, 1992, respondent Alfonso Lopez, Jr., then a twelfth
grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at
school carrying a concealed .38 caliber handgun and five bullets.'
8 4
Acting on an anonymous tip, school officials confronted Lopez, who
admitted that he was carrying the weapon.185 After being advised of
his rights, Lopez explained that an individual he identified as "Gil-
bert" had given him the gun to deliver to another individual named
'Jason" for use in a "gang war."'
8 6
State authorities immediately charged Lopez with violating
§ 46.03 (a) (1) of the Texas Penal Code. 8 7 For over twenty years, this
statute made it a felony for a person to go "on the premises of a school
or an educational institution" while carrying a firearm and stipulated
a punishment of up to ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 188
At the time of the Lopez incident, over forty states had similar laws. 189
The state charges were dismissed after a federal grand jury indicted
Lopez for violating the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990,190 which
makes it illegal to possess a firearm in a school zone.' 9 '
Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(q)
"was unconstitutional as it is beyond the power of Congress to legislate
control over our public schools."' 92 The District Court denied the
motion, concluding that § 922(q) "is a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress' well-defined power to regulate activities in and affecting com-
merce, and the 'business' of elementary, middle, and high schools...
affects interstate commerce.' u93 Lopez subsequently waived his right
to ajury trial and was tried on the stipulated evidence. 194 The District
Court convicted Lopez and sentenced him to six months imprison-
ment, to be followed by two years of supervised release.' 95
On appeal, Lopez challenged his conviction based on his claim
that § 922(q) exceeded Congress' power to legislate under the Com-
merce Clause. 196 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit con-
184 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct 1624, 1626 (1995).
185 Id.
186 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1352 n.1 (1992).
187 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
188 TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 46.04(a) (1), 12.34.
189 Brief for Respondent at 24 n.20, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No.
93-1260).
190 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).





196 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
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curred, stating that in light of insufficient congressional findings and
legislative history, Congress had exceeded its constitutional power
under the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed
Lopez's conviction.
197
The United States government filed a petition for certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted the govern-
ment's petition' 98 to determine whether § 922(q) was a constitutional
exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 199
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,200 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the Gun Free School Zones Act "neither regulates a commercial
activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected
in any way to interstate commerce," and as such the Act exceeded the
authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the several
States.20' Chief Justice Rehnquist then provided a lengthy review of
the historical development of the Commerce Clause.
202
Touching first on the backdrop of federalism, ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist wrote that the Constitution "creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers" that are "few and defined," and preserves numer-
ous powers for the States.203 ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that such
division of authority "was adopted . . . to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties.
'204
The Chief Justice then turned to an analysis of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause. He wrote that the Constitution dele-
gates to Congress the power "[to] regulate Commerce ... among the
several States .... ,2 05 Referencing ChiefJustice Marshall's opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden,20 6 ChiefJustice Rehnquist described Congress' com-
merce power as "complete in itself [which] may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than [those]
prescribed in the Constitution."207 However, ChiefJustice Rehnquist
197 Id.
198 United States v. Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1995).
199 Lopi7, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
200 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in the opinion of ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist. Id. at 1626.
201 Id. (quoting U.S. CONsr. art 1, § 8, ci. 3).
202 Id.
203 Id. (citing THE FEDERAuST No. 45, at 292-93 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).
204 Id. at 1626 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
205 Id. at 1627 (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, c. 3).
206 Id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
207 Id. (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90).
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commented that the Gibbons Court also acknowledged that the com-
merce power possessed inherent limitations when it stated that "[i] t is
not intended to say that [the Commerce Clause] comprehend[s] that
commerce, which is completely internal ... and which does not ex-
tend to or affect other States." 208
Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized the Court's decisions for
nearly a century following Gibbons v. Ogden as dealing "rarely with the
extent of Congress' power, and almost entirely with the Commerce
Clause as a limit on state legislation that discriminated against inter-
state commerce."20 9 "Under this line of precedent," Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "certain categories of activity such as 'production,'
'manufacturing,' and 'mining' were within the province of state gov-
ernments and thus were beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause."
210
When Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act 211 in 1887,
and the Sherman Antitrust Act212 in 1890, it "ushered in a new era of
federal regulation under the commerce power."213 In dealing with
these statutes, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Court followed the
negative Commerce Clause approach in determining that Congress
could not regulate activities such as "production," "manufacturing,"
and "mining."21 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted, however, that
where the interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce were mingled
together, the Court upheld congressional regulation.2 15
Chief Justice Rehnquist further noted that during the dawn of
the New Deal Era, the Court limited congressional oversight by distin-
guishing between the "direct" and "indirect" effects of intrastate trans-
actions on interstate commerce.2 16 Activities that affected interstate
commerce directly were within Congress' commerce power, while ac-
tivities that affected interstate commerce indirectly were beyond Con-
gress' reach.2 17 The Court drew this distinction for fear that otherwise
"there would be virtually no limit to the federal power.... 218
The Court departed from the distinction between "direct" and
208 Id. (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95).
209 Id. at 1627.
210 Id. at 1627 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942)).
211 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
212 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
213 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
214 Id. at 1627 (citing United States v. E.G. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895)).
215 Id. (citing Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)).
216 Ird.
217 Id. (citing A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935)).
218 Id. at 1628 (quoting Schecter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 548).
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"indirect" effects in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,219 and
ushered in a new period in which the Court expanded the previously
defined scope of congressional authority.220 Chief Justice Rehnquist
summarized the Court's rulings since the late 1930s as holding that
"activities that have.., a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce are within Congress' commerce power."221 Chief Justice
Rehnquist warned, however, that the scope of Congress' commerce
power could not be extended "to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect.. [as to] obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local. .... ,22
Consistent with the structure of Congress' commerce power as
outlined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court identified three broad
categories of activity that Congress could regulate under its commerce
power.223 First, Congress could regulate the use of channels of inter-
state commerce.224 Second, Congress could regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in in-
terstate commerce, even where the threat may come only from intra-
state activities. 225 Finally, Congress could regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 226 Under this
final category, Chief justice Rehnquist clarified that the activity must
"substantially affect," rather than merely "affect" interstate
commerce.227
Having laid the framework for his analysis, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist turned to the current controversy and considered the ability of
Congress to enact the Gun Free School Zones Act.228 Chief Justice
Rehnquist quickly disposed of the first two categories of authority by
indicating that the Act is neither a regulation of the use of the chan-
nels of interstate commerce, nor an attempt to prohibit the interstate
transportation of a commodity through commerce channels. 229
Moreover, the Gun Free School Zones Act is not a regulation seeking
to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in in-
219 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
220 Lope, 115 S.Ct. at 1629.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 1628-29.
223 Id. at 1629.
224 Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) and
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).
225 Id. (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) and Southern R.R Co. v.
United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)).






terstate commerce. 230 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that if
the Gun Free School Zones Act could be sustained, it had to satisfy the
third category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce.
23'
In determining whether the Gun Free School Zones Act would
fall within the third category, Chief Justice Rehnquist first identified
other congressional acts where the Court had held that an activity sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce. 23 2 As examples, he cited cases
challenging acts that involved the regulation of intrastate coal min-
ing,233 intrastate extortionate credit transactions, 34 restaurants utiliz-
ing substantial interstate supplies, 235 inns and hotels catering to
interstate guests, 23 6 and the production and consumption of home
grown wheat.237 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that each case con-
cerned an economic activity that substantially affected interstate
commerce.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, concluded that the possession
of a gun in a school zone did not involve an economic activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce.238 The Gun Free School
Zones Act, argued Chief Justice Rehnquist, "is a criminal statute that
by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of eco-
nomic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terns." 239
Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that even the consumption of
home grown wheat, which is probably the most far reaching example
of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved eco-
nomic activity in a way that possession of a gun in a school zone does
not.2 40 Home consumed wheat could have a substantial influence on
the market price of wheat, and as such, Congress had the power
under the Commerce Clause to assess a penalty for over harvested
wheat.24' Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished the Gun Free School
Zones Act from the various subject matters where the Court has up-
held Congress' exercise of its commerce power by indicating that "the
States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the crimi-
230 Id.
231 Id. at 1630.
232 Id.
233 Id. (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264 (1981)).
234 Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
235 Id. (citing McClung v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1964)).
236 Id. at 1630 (citing Heart ofAtianta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)).
237 Id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
238 Id.
239 Id. at 1630-31.
240 Id. at 1630.
241 Id. at 1630.
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nal law."242 When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced
as criminal by the states, it effects a "change in: the sensitive relation
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction."243 The ChiefJustice
concluded that the Gun Free School Zones Act "displace [s] state pol-
icy choices in ... that its prohibitions apply even in States that have
chosen not to outlaw the conduct in question."244
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Gun Free
School Zones Act contained no jurisdictional elements that would re-
quire the Government to determine that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce.2 45 As an example, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist referenced United States v. Bass 46 in which the Court set
aside a conviction under a federal statute outlawing the receipt, pos-
session or transportation in commerce of any firearm.247 In Bass, the
Court interpreted the possession component of the statute to require
an additional nexus to interstate commerce because the statute was
"ambiguous" and "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it
[would] not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state
balance."248 The Bass Court found that there was an insufficient
nexus between the alleged crime of possessing a firearm and inter-
state commerce.249 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Gun
Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional because it had no express
jurisdictional element that would limit its reach to firearm possessions
that have an explicit connection with interstate commerce. 250
Commenting further about the Act's viability, ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist discussed the lack of congressional findings regarding the effects
upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone.251
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "Congress nor-
mally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce,1252 he com-
mented that "to the extent that congressional findings would enable
[the Court] to evaluate.., that the activity in question substantially
242 Id. at 1631 n.3 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993) (quoting
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982))).
243 Id. at n.3 (citing United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973) (quoting
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971))).
244 Id. at n.3 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 29 n.18, United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624
(1995) (No. 93-1260)).
245 Id. at 1631.
246 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
247 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1202 (1994)).
248 Id. at 1631 (citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 349).
249 Id.
250 Id.




affected interstate commerce... they are lacking here."253
Next, ChiefJustice Rehnquist rebuffed the Government's conten-
tion that Congress had accumulated institutional expertise regarding
the regulation of firearms through previous enactments. 2 54 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist indicated that prior federal enactments and congres-
sional findings could not justify the Gun Free School Zones Act
because they did not deal with the Act's subject matter or its relation-
ship to interstate commerce.2 55 Moreover, ChiefJustice Rehnquist de-
termined that the Gun Free School Zones Act was revolutionary and
represented "a sharp break" with prior federal firearms legislation.256
Chief Justice Rehnquist then rejected the Government's argu-
ment that possession of a firearm in a school zone substantially affects
interstate commerce by increasing the frequency of violent crime.
257
The Government contended that increased violent crime affects the
national economy in two ways. 258 First, insurance spreads the signifi-
cant cost of violent crimes throughout the population.259 Second, vio-
lent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas that
are perceived as unsafe.260 Moreover, the Government argued that
the presence of guns in schools would hamper the learning environ-
ment, which in turn would result in a less productive citizenry and a
dampened national economy.2 61 While Chief Justice Rehnquist
paused to consider the Government's arguments, he eventually re-
jected them.262 Under the Government's "costs of crime" reasoning,
Chief Justice Rehnquist found that it would be "difficult to perceive
any limitation on federal power. '26 Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted
that congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will
engender "legal uncertainty."264 However, the Court diminished this
concern by indicating that Congress has operated under legal uncer-
tainty since the Court in Marbury v. Madison determined that it was the
judiciary's duty "to say what the law is."
2 65
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to follow earlier rulings
253 Id. at 1632.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 1632 (citing United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366 (1992)).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id. (citing United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991)).
260 Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964)).




265 Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803)).
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that had given great deference to Congress.266 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist contended that he would not "pile inference upon inference" in
order to convert congressional Commerce Clause power to a general
police power over the states.
267
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that Congress had over-
stepped its Commerce Clause power in enacting the Gun Free School
Zones Act,268 but described the majority's opinion as a "necessary,
though, limited holding."269 Justice Kennedy emphasized the need
for the Court to prevent the federal government's continued intru-
sion on the states' sovereignty.270 Because the Gun Free School Zones
Act foreclosed the states from "experimenting and exercising their
own judgment" in an area to which they claim a right to act based on
their history and expertise, 271 justice Kennedy saw the Act as an inva-
lid erosion of the Tenth Amendment.272
C. JUSTICE THOMAS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas also joined the majority, but wrote separately to
explain why he thought that the Court has drifted far from its original
understanding of the Commerce Clause.273 Justice Thomas argued
that the substantial effects test, "if taken to its logical extreme, would
give Congress a 'police power' over all aspects of American life."
274
However, Justice Thomas commented that the Court has always "re-
jected readings of the Commerce Clause... that would permit Con-
gress to exercise a police power."275 Justice Thomas additionally
refuted Justice Steven's accusation that the majority decision was a
"radical departure" from precedent.276 Instead, Justice Thomas con-
cluded that "[i]f anything, the 'wrong turn' was the Court's dramatic
departure in the 1930s from a century and a half of precedent."277 Up
until the mid-1930s, Justice Thomas argued, "it was widely understood
266 Id. at 1634.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 1635 (Kennedy J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy's
concurrence.
269 Id. at 1634 (KennedyJ., concurring).
270 Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
271 Id. at 1641 (KennedyJ., concurring).
272 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
273 Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J, concurring).
274 Id. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring).
275 Id. (ThomasJ, concurring).
276 Id. at 1650 (ThomasJ, concurring).
277 Id. at 1649 (Thomas, J, concurring).
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that the Constitution granted Congress only limited powers, notwith-
standing the Commerce Clause. '278 Although Justice Thomas was
willing to return to the original understanding of the Commerce
Clause, he conceded that stare decisis and reliance interests made his
desire unrealistic. 279 Although he did not believe Lopez presented the
appropriate opportunity, Justice Thomas invited the Court to modify
its Commerce Clause jurisprudence at the appropriate juncture.
280
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENTING OPINION
In his dissent, Justice Stevens 281 contended that the welfare of the
United States' future "[c] ommerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States,"28 2 is vitally dependent on the character of the edu-
cation of our children.283 Thus, Justice Stevens argued, Congress has
ample power to prohibit the possession of firearms in or near
schools.2 84 Moreover, Justice Stevens contended that the market for
handguns with school age children is "distressingly substantial," and as
such, it is in the national interest to eliminate that market.
285
E. JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Souter chided the majority for repudiating judicial re-
straint by not deferring to rationally based legislative judgments.2 86
He also argued that the majority's decision "portend[s] a return to
the untenable jurisprudence [the direct/indirect effects test] from
which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago."287 Although
Justice Souter warned the Court to treat this case as a misstep because
it does not conform with the prevailing standard, he expressed con-
cern that the Court may be changing direction toward a new, limited
approach to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.2 88
F. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Breyer dissented from the majority by concluding that the
Act falls within the scope of Congress' commerce power.2 89 In reach-
278 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
279 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
280 Id. at 1651 (Thomas, J., concurring).
281 Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
282 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
283 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286 Id. at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
287 Id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting).
289 Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburgjoined in
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ing his conclusion, Justice Breyer applied three basic principles of
Commerce Clause interpretation. First, Congress' commerce power
encompasses the power to regulate local activities insofar as they "sig-
nificantly" affect interstate commerce.290 Second, in determining
whether a local activity will have a significant effect upon interstate
commerce, the Court must consider the cumulative effect of all simi-
lar instances versus an individual act.291 Third, the Court must give
Congress leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual
connection between the regulated activity and interstate com-
merce.292 Thus, argued Justice Breyer, the issue in the current case is
not whether the regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate com-
merce, but whether Congress had a rational basis for so
concluding.
293
Justice Breyer discussed how, based on statistical and other evi-
dence, Congress could have found a connection between school vio-
lence and interstate commerce.294 Justice Breyer reasoned that
because guns in schools undermine the quality of education, Congress
could have found that education is inextricably intertwined with inter-
state commerce and that gun-related violence in schools is a commer-
cial problem.2
95
Finally,Justice Breyer indicated his three major concerns with the
majority's opinion.2 96 First, he took exception to the Court's uphold-
ing of Congressional actions, such as the regulation of loan-sharking,
which had a less significant impact on commerce than school vio-
lence.2 97 Second, he rejected the majority's distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial transactions, arguing that even if such a
categorization could be made, schools could rationally be placed in
the commercial category.29 8 Third, he believed that the majority's
opinion would create uncertainty in an area of constitutional law that
had been settled since the late 1930s.2 99 Thus, Justice Breyer would
have reversed the Fifth Circuit and upheld the constitutionality of the
Gun Free School Zones Act.300
the opinion.
290 Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
291 Id. at 1658 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
292 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
293 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
294 Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
295 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 1659 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
297 Id. at 1662 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
298 Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
299 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).




This Note argues that the Gun Free School Zones Act is a valid
exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. First,
this Note contends that the majority failed to apply the well-estab-
lished rational standard of review to its analysis of the Act's constitu-
tionality. Under this standard, Congress did not have to provide an
explicit connection between the Gun Free School Zones Act and in-
terstate commerce. Rather, the relevant judicial inquiry was only
whether Congress could have rationally concluded that gun posses-
sion at school affects interstate commerce. Because Congress, in re-
lated gun control legislation, specified the link between juvenile gun
possession and interstate commerce, it could have rationally con-
cluded that guns at school affect interstate commerce. Furthermore,
even if Congress was required to provide express findings linking gun
violence in the schools with interstate commerce, it did so when it
retroactively amended the Gun Free School Zones Act.
Second, this Note contends that the Supreme Court erred in de-
termining that education and local crime issues fall within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of state and local governments. This Note finds
support for Congress' ability to legislate over localized school gun pos-
session under the Commerce Clause in the judicial ratification of simi-
lar gun control legislation and in the Supreme Court's approval of
other social policy legislation which possess more tenuous links to in-
terstate commerce.
Finally, this Note argues that the Supreme Court erred in deter-
mining that gun violence in the schools does not substantially affect
interstate commerce because the presence of guns diminishes the ed-
ucational process. The primary objective of the American educational
system is to prepare the country's future workforce. Given that the
produced goods and services will be traded throughout interstate and
foreign commerce, a deteriorated educational system substantially af-
fects interstate commerce.
A. THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY A RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF
REVIEW
The Supreme Court, in ruling that the Gun Free School Zones
Act was an impermissible exercise of Congress' legislative authority
under the Commerce Clause, contended that the Act's legislative his-
tory did not provide congressional "findings" detailing the nexus be-
tween the regulated activity and interstate commerce.30 1 In so ruling,
301 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
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the Supreme Court erred by failing to apply the well established ra-
tional basis standard of review. Had the Court used the proper stan-
dard of review, it would have upheld the Gun Free School Zones Act
as a constitutional enactment under Congress' commerce power.
1. The Rational Basis Standard of Review
The rational basis test provides that federal courts must defer to a
congressional determination that an activity substantially affects inter-
state commerce.30 2 Thus, acts of Congress are presumed constitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause unless a reviewing court
determines that no rational basis could exist for a congressional find-
ing that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce.
303
Under this deferential standard of review, Congress does not
have to explicitly invoke the Commerce Clause to regulate an activ-
ity.30 4 Congress is not required to identify the source of its power to
act in the text of the statute or in its legislative history.30 5 In fact,
under the rational basis standard, the Court "never requires [s] a legis-
lature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute."3 06 Thus, the
absence of legislative facts have no impact on a rational basis analysis,
but rather legislative judgments may simply "be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data."30 7 In all in-
stances, Congress need not collect evidence as to the nexus between
interstate commerce and the regulated activity.3 08 Instead, the courts'
inquiry into whether Congress could rationally have concluded that a
regulated activity has the requisite effect on interstate commerce is
"restricted to the issue Whether any state of facts either known or
which could reasonably be assumed affords support for [such a
conclusion] ."309
By requiring Congress to provide express congressional findings
302 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981). "A statute enacted by Congress pursuant to
its power 'to regulate commerce... among the several States,'" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
comes with "' a presumption of constitutionality.'" Id. at 323. (quoting Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
303 Id. at 323-24; see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152-56 (1971); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258, 262 (1964).
304 The "constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the
power which it undertakes to exercise." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44, n.18
(1983) (citing Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)).
305 Woods v. Miller Co., 383 U.S. 138, 144 (1948).
306 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993).
307 Id. at 2102.
308 "Congress, of course, may legislate without compiling the kind of 'record' appropri-
ate with respect to judicial or administrative proceedings." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 478 (1980); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) ("'formal find-
ings' of an interstate commerce nexus of course are not necessary.").
309 United States v. Carolene Products Co, 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
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linking gun control at school to interstate commerce, the Supreme
Court failed to apply the rational basis test. As discussed further in
part B below, because guns at school decrease the quality of educa-
tion,310 ease drug trafficking,3 1' and create unnecessary social costs in
the form of medical expenses and increased insurance rates,312 Con-
gress could have rationally concluded that guns affect interstate com-
merce. Under the rationale basis standard, Congress was not required
to collect data evidencing this nexus. Nor was Congress required to
identify the source of its congressional power for the enactment.
Application of the rational basis standard is essential to the con-
stitutional separation of powers. The Supreme Court has explained
that it accords great weight to the decisions of Congress because it is a
co-equal branch of government.3 1 3 To require Congress to identify
the precise source of authority for each of its enactments would un-
duly constrain its ability to legislate and subjugate it to overextending
judicial power.3 14 Thus, in demanding that Congress supply a legisla-
tive record justifying the link between gun possession at school and
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court overstepped its authority.
2. Earlier Gun Control Enactments Provide the Necessary Nexus to
Interstate Commerce
The Court erred in concluding that Congress could only rely on
the legislative history specific to the Gun Free School Zones Act to
provide findings for a rational basis connection to the Commerce
Clause. In addition to the legislative history associated with a particu-
lar piece of legislation, courts may consider the history of other legis-
lation regulating the same class of activities.3 15 The rationale behind
this principle is that after Congress has legislated repeatedly in an
area of national concern, its members gain experience that may re-
310 "Gun violence at school impedes the ability of schools to attract and retain qualified
school personnel and threatens the education goals related to student achievement." Gun
Free School Zones Act Hearings, supra note 166, at 46 (statement of Joel Packer, Legislative
Specialist, National Education Association and National PTA).
311 See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3)-(6) (1994) ("Gun possession in the vicinity of schools is associ-
ated with drug dealing, an activity that Congress has recognized to affect interstate
commerce.").
312 The estimated cost to society for firearm injuries is $387,235 per fatality and $29,870
per non-fatal injury requiring hospitalization. DOROTHY P. RICE Er AL., COST OF INJURY IN
THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 53 (1989).
313 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990); Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981).
314 "Such a requirement would mark an unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory pro-
cedures upon a coordinate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor our dem-
ocratic tradition warrants such a constraint on the legislative process." Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
315 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
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duce debate when Congress again considers action in that area. 16
Moreover, earlier legislative findings can support subsequent enact-
ments, and Congress thus can avoid unnecessary expenditure of the
legislature's time and public resources by not revisiting the same is-
sues each time it legislates.3 17
For more than half a century, Congress has recognized that the
destructive capabilities of firearms provide a basis for federal regula-
tion of their transfer and possession.3 18 Gun control legislation en-
acted during this period contained express interstate commerce
connections.3 1
9
Congress included express ties to interstate commerce when leg-
islating the Federal Firearms Act of 1938.320 For example, the Federal
Firearms Act of 1938 prohibited any unlicensed manufacturer or
dealer from transporting, shipping, or receiving any firearm or ammu-
nition in interstate or foreign commerce,3 21 made it an offense for
"any person" to transport in interstate or foreign commerce any stolen
firearm or ammunition, 22 and outlawed the shipment or transporta-
tion in interstate or foreign commerce of any firearm or ammunition
to any felon or fugitive.
323
When Congress repealed the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 and
reincorporated it almost in its entirety into the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968,324 it reiterated its intention to
ground gun control legislation in the Commerce Clause. 325 The 1968
316 Id. at 503.
317 Cf Id.
318 See National Firearms Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1236; Federal Firearms Act of 1988, 52
Stat. 1250.
319 Congress' earliest gun control legislation was grounded in its taxing power. For ex-
ample, the National Firearms Act, which is applicable only to machine guns, "sawed-off'
shotguns and rifles, silencers, and the like, is grounded on Congress' tax power under
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (originally codified as 26 U.S.C. § 1132;
now codified, as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872). Its prohibitions are based on the
imposition of an excise tax on the business of dealing in such weapons, on their transfers,
along with related requirements for registration of the dealer, the transfers, and the weap-
ons. The Gun Free Schools Zone Act is not tied to taxation registration or reporting, and
is applicable to a broader class of firearms than that covered by the National Firearms Act.
Thus, the National Firearms Act is not considered in analyzing the constitutionality of the
Gun Free School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause. Starting with the Federal Fire-
arms Act of 1938, major gun control legislation has been based on the Commerce Clause.
320 52 Stat. 1250 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-910) (repealed 1968), the provisions of
which, as amended and supplemented, have been carried forward to 18 U.S.C. §921 et seq.
321 15 U.S.C. § 902(a) (1964).
322 15 U.S.C. § 902(g) (1964).
323 15 U.S.C. § 902(d) (1964).
324 See supra note 124.
325 The 1968 Act added a license requirement for any person engaging in the business
of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1).
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Act also contained express congressional findings linking gun control
to interstate commerce.3 26 Congress found, among other things, that
the States could not adequately control the widespread traffic in fire-
arms moving throughout interstate commerce through the exercise of
their police power.327 In order to control firearms traffic moving in
or otherwise affecting interstate commerce, Congress broadened the
1968 Act's scope to regulate all firearms dealers and manufacturers,
not just those conducting an interstate business. 328 Congress deter-
mined that mail-order businesses and the ease with which weapons
could be concealed during transportation required federal control
over all persons engaging in the firearms business.
329
While gun control initiatives through 1968 contained Congress'
express intentions to control interstate commerce, recent legislation
has not contained this explicit interstate commerce element. One
such example is the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986,330
which made it unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a
machine gun. There is no committee report and sparse legislative his-
tory concerning this provision. The only express explanation for it is
the statement by its sponsor, Representative Hughes, stating "I do not
know why anyone would object to the banning of machine guns."33'
This enactment is highly analogous to the Gun Free School Zones Act.
While the legislative history of § 922(o) indicated that Congress con-
sidered the relationship between the availability of machine guns, vio-
lent crime, and narcotics trafficking,332 Congress did not provide
express legislative findings regarding the mere possession of ordinary
firearms. 333
Only a few circuit courts have addressed the constitutionality of




330 Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, 452-53 (adding 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)).
331 See Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041, 1044 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing 132 CONG. REC.
1750 (1986) (statement of Rep. Hughes)).
332 United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1614
(1993), states that "when it first enacted section 922, Congress found facts indicating a
nexus between the regulation of firearms and the commerce power." Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit stated that because "Congress specifically found that at least 750,000 people had
been killed in the United States by firearms... it was thus reasonable for Congress to
conclude that the possession of firearms affects the national economy..." United States v.
Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991). However, neither case finds express legislative
findings that mere private party intrastate possession of firearms that have not moved in
interstate commerce has an effect on interstate commerce.




the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986. 3 4 Surprisingly, one of
the circuits which has upheld § 922(o) is the Fifth Circuit. Even
though the Fifth Circuit in Lopez questioned the constitutionality of
§ 922(o) itself,335 later in United States V. ArdoinP3 6 it found § 922(o)
constitutional based in part upon Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause. The court held that no one could seriously doubt Con-
gress' intention to regulate machine guns.3 37 The Fifth Circuit's
ready acceptance of § 922 (o) appears inconsistent with its earlier deci-
sion regarding the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones Act.
The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988,338 which added 18 U.S.C.
§ 9 22(p), also lacks an express legislative intent to regulate interstate
commerce. Section 922 (p) makes it unlawful for any person to "man-
ufacture, import, ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or receive" any fire-
arms either not detectable "by walk-through metal detectors" or which
"when subjected to inspection by the type of x-ray machines com-
monly used at airports, do not generate an image that accurately de-
picts the shape of any major component."339 Like the Gun Free
School Zones Act, § 922(p) contains no express requirement of an
interstate nexus for the possession offense.3 40 Moreover, the commit-
tee reports accompanying the Act, which indicate that the purpose of
§ 922(p) is to reduce the threat posed by firearms which could avoid
detection at security checkpoints, including courthouses, airports,
etc., do not have an express interstate commerce context.Y"
It is important to note that the Firearms Owners' Protection Act
and the Undetectable Firearms Act, as well as the Gun Free School
Zones Act, are amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 922, which was added by
the Gun Control Act of 1968. As discussed above, the 1968 Act con-
tained specific congressional findings linking gun control to interstate
commerce. Legislative history accompanying prior gun control enact-
ments should be used to convey a nexus between gun possession in
school zones with interstate commerce. If it is not, then other gun
control initiatives which also lack this express connection, such as the
Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986 and the Undetectable Fire-
arms Act of 1988, are also in jeopardy.
334 United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct 1614
(1993); United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991).
335 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1356 (5th Cir. 1992).
336 19 F.Sd 177 (5th Cir. 1994).
337 Id. at 178.
338 Pub. L. No. 100-649, 102 Stat. 3816 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (p)).
339 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1).
340 See 18 U.S.C. § 922.




3. The Gun Free Schools Zone Amendment: Subsequent Announcement of
Specific Congressional Findings
While Congress did not provide express findings linking gun pos-
session in school zones to interstate commerce when the legislation
was initially enacted, it amended the Act342 to provide such findings
after the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Lopez.m - 3 In the amendment, Con-
gress stated that "[c]rime at the local level is exacerbated by the inter-
state movement of. . . guns" and "[f]irearms and ammunition move
easily in interstate commerce and have been found in increasing num-
bers in and around schools. .... ,,344
The Supreme Court wrongly ignored this amendment in deter-
mining the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones Act. Be-
cause the amendment expressly evoked the Commerce Clause as
Congress' authority for the Act and provided congressional findings
linking gun control in schools with interstate commerce, the Supreme
Court should have upheld the constitutionality of the Act. Generally,
where congressional findings are made, they carry great weight.3 45
The Supreme Court has indicated that when Congress makes findings
that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
the courts must defer "if there is any rational basis for such a find-
ing."3 46 Moreover, the Court has announced that where there are spe-
cifically stated reasons for Congress' action, "our [judicial] inquiry is
at an end."347 In the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has never set
aside such stated reasons as being without a rational basis.
348
Lower courts expressed their willingness to approve the Gun Free
School Zones Act based on the congressional findings contained in
the amendment. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, the
district court of Kansas 349 found that the Gun Free School Zones Act
342 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322
§ 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125-26. Congress found that "firearms and ammunition move
easily in interstate commerce and have been found in increasing numbers in and around
schools" and that the resulting "occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in
a decline in the quality of education in our country" which has had an "adverse impact on
interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States." I4 Furthermore,
the Senate stated that "Congress has power under the Commerce Clause and other provi-
sions of the Constitution to enact measures to ensure the integrity and safety of the Na-
tion's Schools." 139 CONG. REc. S16,302 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993).
343 2 F.3d 1342, 1368 (5th Cir. 1992).
344 Id.
345 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981); see also United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991).
346 Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990).
347 United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1981).
348 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363.
349 United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1994).
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was constitutional because the amendment explicitly set forth the nec-
essary findings.350 Even the Fifth Circuit in Lopez 5' indicated that
given clear congressional intent to ground the Gun Free School Zones
Act in the Commerce Clause, the Act could be held constitutional.35 2
From the initiation of the Gun Free School Zones Act, Congress in-
tended to legislate the Act according to its commerce power. This is
evidenced by the fact that Congress quickly passed the amendment
following the Fifth Circuit's instructions in Lopez.353 In the amend-
ment, Congress loudly voiced its continuing intention to ground the
Gun Free School Zones Act in the Commerce Clause. As Congress
provided, albeit retroactively, an express link between the Act and in-
terstate commerce, the Supreme Court should have found the Act to
be a constitutionally accepted exercise of Congress' commerce power.
B. CONGRESS' ABILITY TO REGULATE OVER INTRASTATE EDUCATION AND
GUN CONTROL ACTIVITIES
1. Congress' Ability to Regulate Intrastate Activities
The Supreme Court erred in determining that only local govern-
ments can regulate educational activities, including gun possession in
school. While education traditionally has been under the domain of
local government, the denomination of an activity as "local" or "intra-
state" does not in itself resolve the question of whether Congress may
regulate it under the Commerce Clause. The power of Congress over
interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce
among the states. Instead, Congress' commerce power extends to
those intrastate activities which affect interstate commerce.354
Several cases demonstrate that the Court has recognized that
Congress may regulate purely intrastate activities if those activities af-
fect interstate commerce. The Supreme Court in Perez v. United
States355 ruled that even an activity which is purely intrastate in charac-
ter may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, "combined with
like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the
350 Id. at 1334.
351 Lop&. 2 F.3d at 1363.
352 Id. at 1368.
353 The amendment was passed on November 19, 1993 (three months after the Fifth
Circuit's opinion).
354 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); see also United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942). Moreover, Congress' power over this type of intrastate
activity stems from Congress' constitutional authority "to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" its enumerated powers, which includes
the Commerce power. See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
355 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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States or with foreign nations."356 Similarly, the Supreme Court in
New York v. United States3 57 recognized that "activities once considered
purely local have come to have effects on the national economy," and
have accordingly come within the scope of Congress' commerce
power.3 58 Finally, in Wickard v. Filburn,359 the Supreme Court stated
that although an "activity [is] local and . . . may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if
it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce . "360
Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Court has often upheld
legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause and designed to
regulate purely intrastate activities which affect interstate commerce.
Among other things, the Supreme Court found that Congress may
permissibly regulate the price of milk sold intrastate,3 6 1 home grown
wheat consumption, 36 2 local labor wage and hour provisions, 363 and
intrastate redemption of firearms from pawnshops36 4 on the basis that
such transactions affect interstate commerce.
Gun violence at schools degrades the overall quality of educa-
tional instruction in many ways, including: increasing the dropout
rate; discouraging talented resources from entering the teaching pro-
fession; and distracting attention away from the learning process. An
ineffective educational system will affect interstate commerce by un-
derpreparing the nation's future workforce, which in an increasingly
complex society produces substandard goods and services. Arguably,
the education system has a more substantial impact on interstate com-
merce than home grown wheat because labor is a significant input in
almost all production and has effects beyond just one type of market.
Because the Supreme Court has approved federal regulation of activi-
ties which have more tenuous links to interstate commerce, such as
home grown wheat, the Court should have upheld the Gun Free
School Zones Act.
2. Congress' Use of Its Commerce Power to Achieve Social Reforms
Where Congress has used its commerce power to legislate neces-
sary social reforms which have a "real and substantial relation to the
national interest," the judiciary has given Congress broader discretion
356 Id. at 150.
357 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992).
358 Id. at 2419.
359 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
360 Id. at 125.
361 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118 (1942).
362 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 137-39.
363 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
364 Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 833 (1974).
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over local activities.3 65 In the civil rights context, the Supreme Court
ruled in Katzenbach v. McClung6 6 that a statute prohibiting racial dis-
crimination at local restaurants was a legitimate exercise of Congress'
commerce power because discrimination discouraged travel by Afri-
can-Americans and affected purchases of food and restaurant supplies
from other states.367 In Daniel v. Paul3 68 the Court found that an
amusement park exercising discriminatory practices affected inter-
state commerce. Although the park was located deep in the Alabama
countryside, some customers, food, and equipment came from out of
state. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,3 6 9 the Supreme Court
determined that Congress could regulate a single hotel located in
Georgia because of the deleterious effect that racial discrimination in
public lodging had on the interstate movement of persons and goods.
Outside of the civil rights context, the Supreme Court has al-
lowed Congress to legislate broadly under its commerce power to reg-
ulate criminal activity. In United States v. Russel 370 the Court upheld
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which made it a federal
crime to burn down a rental apartment. The Court held that even
where an individual criminal activity has a minimal effect on interstate
commerce, Congress could regulate it.371 In Perez v. United States,
372
the Court upheld a federal statute criminalizing loan-sharking activity
which occurred exclusively at a local level.373 The Court stated that
Congress may judge that such transactions "though purely intrastate
... affect interstate commerce."3 74
The majority's holding in Lopez is contrary to precedent which
has upheld congressional acts with more tenuous connections to in-
terstate and foreign commerce than the connection in Lopez. Just as
the Court determined that racial discrimination in local businesses de-
ters interstate travel,3 75 violence around schools dissuades travel into
those areas. Moreover, just as a local amusement park exercising dis-
criminatory practices affected interstate commerce because supplies
came from outside the state, schools receive texts and other educa-
tional supplies, many of which probably are. sourced out-of-state. Fur-
365 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
366 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
367 Id. at 301.
368 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
369 379 U.S. at 246.
370 471 U.S. 858 (1985).
371 Id. at 862.
372 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
373 Id. at 147.
374 Id. at 154.
375 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964).
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thermore, violence may affect the labor supply to schools. Numerous
teachers may be unwilling to risk personal harm to provide their serv-
ices to violent schools.3 76 Thus, school violence may create a shortage
of qualified instructors, and affect the national market for such indi-
viduals, which would obviously impact interstate commerce. More-
over, the Court has upheld federal laws criminalizing acts which are
more localized in nature than school gun violence. Arguably, educa-
tion has a stronger relationship to the national interest than localized
loan-sharking377 or arson. 378 Finally, based on Supreme Court prece-
dent, courts have generally given more leeway to social reform legisla-
tion, such as the Gun Free School Zones Act. Courts have refused to
overturn such legislation for a half-century. 379
3. The Impact of the Tenth Amendment
Contrary to Justice Kennedy's concern,3 80 the Gun Free School
Zones Act does not erode states' Tenth Amendment rights by regulat-
ing education and localized crime. "The Court long ago rejected the
suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the States by the
Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority under the
Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces the States' exercise of
their police power powers." 38' The Tenth Amendment does place
limits on Congress' ability to impose requirements directly upon state
governments. 82 Those limitations have no relevance, however, to
congressional regulation of private activity. National League of Cities
distinguished between "the authority of Congress to enact laws regu-
lating individual businesses" and the "exercise of congressional au-
thority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States. '383
Moreover, in Hodel v. Indiana,38 4 the Court found that "a claim that
congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reason-
376 "Gun violence at school impedes that ability of schools to attract and retain qualified
school personnel." Gun Free School Zones Act Hearings, supra note 166, at 46 (Statement of
Joel Packer, Legislative Specialist, National Education Association and National PTA).
377 See Perez, 402 U.S. at 154.
378 See United States v. Russell, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985).
379 See, e.g., Pere., 402 U.S. at 154; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 246 (1964).
380 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1635 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
381 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 291 (1981).
382 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(overruled by Garcia).
383 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845. Although the Supreme Court overturned
National League of Cities in Garcia, nothing in Garcia suggests that the requirement that the
federal law regulate states as states to implicate the Tenth Amendment is erroneous. Gar-
cia, 469 U.S. at 537-38.
384 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
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ing of National League of Cities... [requires] a showing that the chal-
lenged statute regulates the 'States as States."' 385
The Gun Free School Zones Act does not regulate the states, but
instead regulates the possession of firearms by individuals. Unlike
other federal crime legislation which is currently under attack, such as
the Brady Act,3 6 the Gun Free School Zones Act imposes no affirma-
tive obligations upon state or local government units, nor does it limit
state and local autonomy with respect to curricular choices or re-
sources allocation. Rather, the Act incorporates state and local policy
choices by exempting individuals licensed to possess firearms under
state or local law.
3 87
Even though Congress possesses unquestioned authority under
the Commerce Clause to preempt state law,388 Congress has tried to
minimize its intrusion on state prerogatives.8 89 The Act provides that
"nothing in it shall be construed as preempting or preventing a state
or local government from enacting a statue establishing gun-free
school zones." °90 The Act thus supplements, rather than supplants,
the efforts of state and local authorities, and hence, the Gun Free
School Zones Act does not violate the Tenth Amendment.
C. GUN POSSESSION IN SCHOOLS SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTS INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
The Supreme Court was also wrong in determining that gun pos-
session in school zones does not "substantially affect" interstate com-
merce. Numerous reports and studies clearly indicate that gun
possession in a school zone substantially affects interstate commerce
in at least three ways: a less productive workforce, proliferated drug
trafficking, and increased insurance costs.
3 9 1
1. A Less Productive Workforce
The National School Safety Center estimates that more then
385 Id. at 323.
386 Pub. L. No. 103-159, Title I, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified in scattered subsections
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925).
387 18 U.S.C. 922(q) (1) (B) (ii) (Supp. IV 1992). Also individuals acting pursuant to con-
tractual agreements with the school and local law enforcement officers are exempted from
the Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)B)(v)-(vi) (Supp. IV 1992).
388 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2435 (1992).
-389 The Act provides that if state or local officials authorize (in any variety of ways) the
possession of firearms in a school zone, the federal prohibition will not apply. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (B) (ii)-(vi) (Supp. IV 1992). For example, individuals acting pursuant
to contractual agreements with the school and local law enforcement officers are ex-
empted from the Act. Id.
390 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
391 United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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100,000 students carry guns to school every day.392 Twelve percent of
urban high school students have had guns fired at them.393 In any six
month period, several hundred thousand school children are victims
of violent crimes in or near their schools. 3 94 This excessive firearm
violence has a deleterious effect upon the educational process. The
widespread violence in schools significantly interferes with the quality
of education in those schools by increasing dropout rates395 and con-
tributing to poor academic performance. 396 As Secretary of Educa-
tion Richard Riley has observed, the threat of violence in the schools
"creates an environment where children cannot learn, teachers can-
not teach, and parents are reluctant to send their kids to school."
3 97
This educational demise harms the United States' economic con-
dition because education is "inextricably intertwined" with the na-
tion's economy.398 Recently, this link between education and the
health of the national economy has strengthened. Technological
changes and innovations in management techniques have caused
greater demand for educational skills in the workplace. 399 There is
evidence that "service, manufacturing and construction jobs are being
displaced by technology that requires a better-educated worker or,
more likely, are being exported overseas."400 Increasing global com-
petition has also strengthened the connection between education and
the nation's economic well-being. "The portion of the American
economy attributable to international trade nearly tripled between
1950 and 1980, and more than 70 percent of American-made goods
now compete with imports."40 1 The United States suffers from nega-
tive trade balances and decreases in real hourly compensation due
significantly to "students who emerge from classrooms without the
reading or mathematical skills necessary to compete." 40 2 Congress has
previously stated that "functionally or technologically illiterate" Ameri-
cans in the work force "erod [e]" our economic "standing in the inter-
392 Children Carrying Weapons: Why the Recent Increase: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1992) [hereinafter Children Carrying Weapons].
393 CATHERINE H. WHITAKER & LISA D. BASTIAN, U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, TEENAGE VIcrIMs,
A NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY REPORT (1991).
394 Children and Guns: Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and
Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
395 Gun Free School Zones Act Hearings, supra note 166, at 46.
396 Id.
397 SAFEGUARDING OUR YOUTH: VIOLENCE PREVENTION FOR OUR NATION'S CHILDREN, Fo-
rum Proceedings 8 (July 20-21, 1993).
398 Gun Free School Zones Act Hearings, supra note 166, at 46-47.
399 Trying Harder, THE ECONOMIST; A SURVEY OF EDUCATION 5 (Nov. 21, 1992).





national marketplace."40 3  Finally, many firms require educated
workers. 40 4 If companies cannot get enough skilled workers ,in the
United States, they will "move the skilled jobs out of the country."
40 5
As the educational process prepares the nation's workforce, their di-
minished productivity, resulting from substandard preparation, will
substantially affect future interstate and foreign commerce.
B. OTHER EFFECTS OF GUNS AT SCHOOL ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE:
PROLIFERATED DRUG TRAFFICKING AND INCREASED MEDICAL/
INSURANCE COSTS
In addition to deteriorating the quality of education, guns are
often associated with illegal drug sales. As the judiciary has approved
of Congress' use of its commerce power to regulate illegal drugs, it
should have upheld Congress' regulation of guns, which are the tools
of the drug trade.
Eighteen percent of all weapons in school incidents are drug re-
lated.40 6 Approximately forty percent of violence caused by persons
under Uventy-five years of age is drug-related violence.40 7 Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate activities related to the
possession and sale of drugs is well recognized. 40 8 Even the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Lopez recognized that Congress' commerce power supports leg-
islation controlling the drug possession and sale.409 Arguably,
because weapons are being carried into schools to support the drug
trade,410 the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones Act could
403 The Education and Training for a Competitive America Act of 1988, enacted as Title
VI of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title VI,
102 Stat. 1107, 1469.
404 See Reauthorization ofExpiring Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Programs: Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor and the Subcomm. on Education, Arts and Humanities of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
405 See Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Im-
provement Amendments, Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 130 (1988).
406 Children Carrying Weapons, supra note 392, at 36 (Statement of Ronald D. Stephens).
407 Children and Guns: Hearings before the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and
Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1989) (Statement of Thomas Scalea, M.D.).
408 See, e.g., United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 911 (1991); United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d 949, 951-53 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972).
409 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366-67 n.50 (5th Cir. 1992).
410 "As street narcotic enforcement programs become more effective, we force gang
members to distribute narcotics in schools, children of all ages are used to further this
purpose... Recruitment is achieved through offering incentives ... if this cannot be ac-
complished, it is often then done through fear and intimidation ... with controlling the
flow of weapons and drugs into the schools, we can lessen their influence in the school




rest on this factor alone.
Another significant effect of gun possession at school on inter-
state commerce is increased medical and insurance costs. On average,
each firearm injury or fatality costs the American public approxi-
mately $50,000.4 1 1 In one year, guns caused 268,000 injuries, includ-
ing 31,556 fatalities in the United States.412 These firearm injuries
cost society an estimated $14.4 billion.413 Congress has recognized
the direct connection between guns and rising insurance rates.
41 4
All of these costs factor into the determination of whether gun
possession at school substantially affects interstate commerce. As
Wickard v. Filburn indicated, the relevant inquiry is whether the regu-
lated activity has "a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce," not whether the effect is "direct" or "indirect."41 5 Any activity
whose annual consequences impose actual costs of $14.4 billion on
individuals, insurance companies, and the government is necessarily
"commerce which concerns more States than one and has a real and
substantial relation to the national interest.
'4 16
VI. FUTURE IMPACT OF THE DECISION
The future effects of the Lopez decision are difficult to ascertain.
The real impact of Lopez on school violence may be minimal. The
Lopez loss should be mitigated by the fact that forty-three states have
statutes imposing sanctions on individuals who bring guns onto school
property. Even Lopez was initially charged under Texas state law for
violating a Texas penal statute which prohibits carrying a firearm at
school. Alternatively, Lopez could be circumvented by linking educa-
tional funds or other programs dependent on federal financial aid to
the level of states' compliance in the enforcement of a gun ban. This
alternative would comply with the Court's decision in United States v.
New York.
Alternatively, Lopezs impact may be much broader than the Court
411 RicE ET AL., supra note 312, at 50.
412 Id.
413 Id. The Cost of Injury report calculated the direct costs of annual firearm injuries at
$911,411,000 in actual out-of-pocket spending for goods and services: $863,586,000 for
medical care, $13,743,000 in home modification and vocational rehabilitation expenses for
survivors of firearm injuries, and $34,082,000 in administrative costs to the insurance in-
dustry. Id. at 177-79. The remaining $13.5 billion represented the indirect cost to society
of workers' lost productivity. Id. at 173, 177.
414 Compare 138 CONG. REG. E1532 (daily ed. May 27, 1992) (statement of Rep. Hamil-
ton) ("We pay the cost of crime in higher taxes, insurance rates, and prices.") with United
States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Congress may reasonably conclude that
possession of firearms affects the national economy through the insurance industry").
415 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
416 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964).
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anticipated. The Lopez decision threatens the constitutionality of ex-
isting gun control statutes such as the Firearm Owners' Protection
Act, the Undetectable Firearms Act, and the Brady Act. Like the Gun
Free School Zones Act, none of these acts contain express commerce
elements or have a legislative history directly linking the objective of
the Act to interstate commerce. Thus, if the Court decides not to ap-
ply a rational basis test to these statutes, their existence may be in
jeopardy. In addition, Lopez may have a "chilling effect" on other fed-
eral anticrime legislation. As Congress historically has used its com-
merce power to enact federal crime bills, the Lopez decision may place
severe constitutional limits on the federal government's ability to en-
act future legislation addressing the national problem of crime. Con-
gress may have to use another one of its enumerated powers, such as
the taxing and spending power, to create future federal crime
legislation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Note concludes that the majority improperly decided United
States v. Lopez for three reasons. First, the majority failed to apply a
rational basis test to its analysis of the constitutionality of the Gun Free
School Zones act. While Congress did not provide an explicit connec-
tion between the Act and interstate commerce when the legislation
was originally passed, under the rational basis test the Act would still
be constitutional because prior gun control legislation laid the foun-
dation for its enactment. Second, the Supreme Court erred in decid-
ing that Congress could not regulate education and local crime
because these were traditionally state domains. Support for Congress'
ability to legislate over school gun possession through the Commerce
Clause can be found in the Supreme Court's ratification of other lo-
calized crime control legislation and its approval of social policy legis-
lation which possess more tenuous links to interstate commerce.
Finally, the Supreme Court erred in determining that gun violence in
schools does not substantially affect interstate commerce because such
violence deteriorates educational standards and provides a less pro-
ductive future workforce.
Lopez may severely impact crime control measures. The Lopez de-
cision threatens the constitutionality of existing gun control statutes
such as the Firearm Owners' Protection Act, the Undetectable Fire-
arms Act, and the Brady Act. As Congress historically has used its
commerce power to enact federal crime bills, the Lopez decision may
place severe constitutional limits on the federal government's ability
to enact future legislation to address the national problem of crime.
1996] 1537
1538 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 86
Accordingly, the potential ramifications of Lopez stretch far beyond
the issues of guns in schools to a wide range of existing and future
federal crime control measures.
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